This study uses restricted microdata from the National Compensation Survey to examine the impact of auto enrollment on employee compensation. By boosting plan participation, automatic enrollment likely increases employer costs when previously unenrolled workers receive matching retirement plan contributions. Our data show significant negative correlation between employer match rates and automatic enrollment provision. We find no evidence that total costs differ between firms with and without automatic enrollment, and no evidence that defined contribution costs crowd out other forms of compensation, suggesting that firms might be lowering their potential and/or default match rates enough to completely offset the higher costs of automatic enrollment without needing to reduce other compensation costs.
Introduction
The dramatic rise of employer-sponsored defined contribution (DC) plans in the United States has been accompanied by increasing concern about the retirement security that DC plans will provide. At the heart of the matter are two undisputed facts: 1) many employees do not sign up for their employer's retirement plan, and 2) contribution rates among participants are relatively low.
To tackle what has been described as inertia with regard to participation, increasingly employers are automatically enrolling new employees while allowing them to opt out. A number of studies have documented the success of automatic enrollment in increasing participation in retirement plans (Beshears et al. 2009; Choi et al. 2002 Choi et al. , 2004 Madrian and Shea 2001) . Yet, by boosting plan participation automatic enrollment likely increases employer costs (at least in the short term). Before auto enrollment, most employers encouraged workers to participate and contribute to retirement plans by matching some percentage or dollar amount of their contributions (Choi et al. 2002) . But as previously unenrolled workers begin receiving matching retirement plan contributions, employers' costs of offering a match will increase-all else equal.
In fact, companies often cite the cost of matching contributions as the most important barrier to adopting automatic enrollment (Bruno 2008) .
Employers might respond to the higher costs associated with automatic enrollment by cutting wages, reducing health benefits, or trimming the plan's match rates. Some might eliminate the employer match altogether. This paper examines the impact of auto enrollment on employee compensation using restricted microdata from the National Compensation Survey. We find that match rates in plans with automatic enrollment average about 0.38 percentage points or 11 percent lower than those without automatic enrollment, even after we control for other characteristics. In addition, we find no evidence that employers with opt-out 401(k)s have defined contribution costs that are any different from employers with opt-in 401(k)s. We also find no evidence that costs associated with automatic enrollment reduce other employer compensation. So while auto enrollment has been shown to increase the number of workers participating in private pension plans, our findings suggest that it might also reduce the level of pension contributions. These findings improve our understanding of employer behavior and provide insight into how automatic enrollment might impact employees' retirement security.
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Background
The pension landscape in the United States has been gradually shifting as employers move away from offering their employees defined benefit (DB) pension plans towards offering them DC plans. Between 1989 and 2012, the proportion of private industry full-time workers participating in DB pension plans declined from 42 to 20 percent, while the share participating in DC plans increased from 40 to 51 percent (Wiatrowski 2011 Employers are also concerned about employees who do not enroll in 401(k)s, in part because these employees jeopardize the company's performance on nondiscrimination testsrules forbidding employers from providing benefits exclusively to highly paid employees. By increasing participation among non-highly compensated employees (NHCEs), automatic enrollment makes it possible for employers to raise or eliminate contribution limits on highly compensated employees (HCEs)-effectively increasing their pension benefits. (See Brady Not only are these workers not taking advantage of tax-deferred opportunities to save for retirement, but many are giving away money by not taking advantage of their employer's matching contributions. Recognizing the capacity for automatic enrollment to increase participation in DC plans and thereby increase retirement savings, the U.S. Treasury Department authorized employer's adoption of auto enrollment in 1998 for new hires and again in 2000 for previously hired employees not already participating in their employer's plan (Choi et al. 2004) . 1 Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher (2010) use the Survey of Income and Program Participation to explore some of the reasons why workers do not participate in their employers' defined contribution plans. While opt-out mechanisms are unlikely to increase participation among workers whose reasons for not participating are related to eligibility, or monetary constraints, such as "cannot afford to contribute" or "do not want to tie up money," automatic enrollment might be effective when non-participation is due to inertia, for example, "not thinking about it."
(2007) for a brief exposition of the cross-subsidies incentives from nondiscrimination testing.) In fact, one-fifth of plan sponsors said that improving nondiscrimination test results was their primary motivation for offering automatic enrollment, with 43 percent finding a positive impact versus only 1 percent who found the effect to be negative (Deloitte Development LLC 2010) .
Automatic Enrollment. Automatic enrollment (also known as "negative election") is a 401(k) plan feature in which elective employee deferrals begin without requiring the employee to submit a request to join the plan. When automatic enrollment is present, employees have a predetermined percentage of their pay deferred as soon as they become eligible for the plan. If employees do not want to participate, they must actively request to be excluded from the plan.
Several studies and anecdotal accounts suggest that automatic enrollment has succeeded in dramatically increasing 401(k) participation (Beshears et al.2009; Choi et al. 2002 Choi et al. , 2004 Madrian and Shea 2001) . Madrian and Shea (2001) , for example, document a 48 percentage point increase in 401(k) participation among newly hired employees and an 11 percentage point increase in participation overall at one large U.S. company 15 months after the adoption of automatic enrollment. The authors also note that automatic enrollment has been particularly successful at increasing 401(k) participation among employees least likely to participate in retirement savings plans, namely those who are young, lower-paid, black, or Hispanic. Act of 2006 (PPA) . Despite its success in increasing employee participation and the incentives for employers to adopt it, the percentage of plans with automatic enrollment remained relatively low before the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA). The primary purpose of the PPA was to strengthen the DB pension system; however, it included a number of provisions to greatly enhance 401(k) plans-particularly with respect to auto enrollment (Patterson, Veal, and Wray 2006) . Many of these provisions were motivated by research findings which showed that procrastination and inertia play an important role in workers' savings choices and that financial literacy and planning abilities varied widely among workers. As a result, the PPA included a number of fiduciary and tax incentives that were designed to encourage employers to adopt various automatic provisions, including auto enrollment, in their 401(k) plans (Nessmith, Utkus, and Young 2007) . Specifically, the PPA removed disincentives to adopting automatic enrollment by: 1) offering more attractive safe harbor rules; 2) preempting state payroll-withholding laws; and 3) protecting employers from fiduciary responsibility for their 401(k) plan's investment performance (Patterson, Veal, and Wray 2006) .
The Pension Protection
Existing safe harbor rules, for plans without automatic enrollment feature, allow employers to avoid nondiscrimination tests by providing either: 1) a nonelective contribution of at least 3 percent of compensation for all eligible NHCEs; or 2) a matching contribution of 100 percent on the first 3 percent of pay plus 50 percent of the next 2 percent of pay-for a maximum potential employer matching contribution of 4 percent of compensation (Purcell 2007 ).
Although automatic enrollment by itself makes it easier for employers to pass nondiscrimination tests, the PPA provides another safe harbor that allows employers with auto enrollment to avoid nondiscrimination tests altogether. To qualify for the PPA safe harbor, participants must contribute at least 3 percent of pay in their first year in the plan, increasing it by 1 percentage point annually up to 6 percent of pay. However, higher contributions up to 10 percent of pay are permitted (Purcell 2007) . The PPA safe harbor also requires employers to provide a matching contribution of 100 percent on the first 1 percent of pay plus 50 percent of the next 5 percent of pay-for a maximum potential employer matching contribution of 3.5 percent of compensation (Purcell 2007; Patterson, Veal, and Wray 2006) . This lower match rate may also make automatic enrollment more attractive to employers (O'Hare and Amendola
2007).
In addition, the automatic enrollment provision in the PPA preempts state payrollwithholding laws. Before 2006, many employers were hesitant to automatically enroll employees because of state payroll-withholding laws that might subject employers to lawsuits by Finally, the PPA amended ERISA section 404(c) to relieve employers of fiduciary liability for the performance of default investments in their auto enrollment plans-in effect granting the same protections that participant-directed investments receive (Patterson, Veal, and Wray 2006; Purcell 2007) .
Automatic Enrollment after the PPA. Various sources point to the increasing popularity of automatic enrollment plans after the PPA. For example, Engelhardt (2011) found that since the PPA, 401(k) participation increased more in states that required employees' written permission before employers could deduct contributions from their wages-suggesting that before the PPA, state wage-payment laws deterred employers from adopting auto enrollment. The majority of plans who automatically enroll employees do this only for new hires. In the PSCA survey, 82 percent of plans reported that auto enrollment was used only for new hires (PSCA 2011) . There is some evidence that employers are reluctant to "backsweep" existing nonparticipants because of the desire to minimize employer match contributions and other planrelated costs (Andersen et al. 2001) .
The Costs of Automatic Enrollment. Most companies with 401(k)s offer an employer match-a contribution made by the employer to supplement employee contributions (DworakFisher 2007) . But holding all other factors constant, the adoption of automatic enrollment will increase employer costs. Increasing the number of 401(k) participants increases employers' compensation through employer matches. A 2001 Vanguard report outlining the benefits and costs of adopting automatic enrollment noted that the largest expense related to auto enrollment "…is the money needed to fund any employer match for new enrollees" (Andersen et al. 2001 ).
The same report noted that aside from the extra costs of an employer match, firms adopting automatic enrollment are likely to incur additional costs associated with maintaining and servicing a large number of small accounts-especially if auto enrollment is extended to all eligible employees (Andersen et al. 2001) . A recent survey found that among plans that reported being unlikely to adopt auto enrollment in 2011, 73 percent cited the increased cost of the employer match as a primary barrier (Hess and Xu 2011) .
Recognizing that automatic enrollment may be costly for employers, Soto and Butrica (2009) was the first study to analyze employers' profit-maximizing behavior with regard to auto enrollment. The authors identified three ways in which employers could respond to the increase in costs due to automatic enrollment: 1) Reduce the match offered to workers to offset the increase in costs from automatic enrollment.
2) Reduce compensation other than pension benefits to keep total compensation at the same level as before the introduction of the auto enrollment feature.
3) Leave the pension and other compensation arrangements unchanged, which increases the total compensation (wages plus pensions plus other benefits) paid to workers.
In their study, the authors focused on measuring the extent to which firms adjust their match rate to offset the increase in costs due to automatic enrollment. In the past, important incentives for firms to offer a match have been to increase participation and contributions (Choi et al. 2002) and to avoid nondiscrimination tests through 401(k) matching safe harbors. But some research finds that a match has only a modest impact on plan participation beyond the boost from automatic enrollment (Beshears et al. 2009 )-particularly for low-income workers (DworakFisher 2008) . Additionally, the PPA introduced an automatic enrollment safe harbor with lower minimum required matching contribution rates. Each of these results reduces employers' incentives to keep existing match rates.
In fact, using data from the Form 5500 filings, Soto and Butrica (2009) showed that firms with auto enrollment have lower employer match rates than those without automatic enrollment-suggesting that employers might reduce match rates when they begin automatically enrolling participants. Their conclusions remain tentative and controversial, however, because information on automatic enrollment was available for only a subset of companies (from a different data source) and data limitations forced the authors to construct match rates based on the ratio of total employer contributions to total employee contributions, instead of using actual match rates.
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Another way to keep costs down, and one not identified in Soto and Butrica (2009) (PSCA 2012) . Purcell (2007) notes that many plan sponsors have been reluctant to set the default contribution rate higher than 3 percent of pay because that was the rate used in examples of permissible automatic enrollment practices published by the IRS.
Studies have shown that automatically enrolled employees tend to remain with the default options of their plan. Madrian and Shea (2001) showed that, at least in the short term, only a small fraction of automatically enrolled 401(k) participants elect a contribution rate or asset allocation that differs from the company-specified default. Additionally, a Vanguard study found that automatic enrollment leads to lower plan contribution rates, as participants who would have voluntarily saved at a higher rate remain at the lower default contribution rates (Nessmith, Utkus, and Young 2007) . The same study also found that the default contribution rate under automatic enrollment does not appear to affect whether employees quit the plan or not. Thus, one potential way for firms to offset the higher match-related costs created by higher participation rates under automatic enrollment is to set low default contribution rates.
This study reexamines the findings in Soto and Butrica (2009) using better and more recent data, and expands that study to more broadly analyze the relationship between auto enrollment and total compensation.
Data
This study uses restricted microdata from the National Compensation Survey (NCS) conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NCS is a large nationally representative survey which collects information from establishments on occupational earnings, the incidence and costs of employer-sponsored benefits among workers, and the provisions of employersponsored benefit plans. The sample covers civilian workers in private industry and state and local governments. The NCS collects employer-level data on establishment size, region, and industry. It also collects job-level information on unionization, percentage of full-time workers, occupation, participation in retirement plans, the incidence of benefits and provisions of benefit plans, such as insurance (life, short-term disability, and long-term disability), paid leave (sick, vacation, jury, personal, and family) and paid holidays, and detailed plan provisions (i.e. through plan brochures) for health care (medical, dental, vision, and prescription drugs) and retirement plans (defined benefit and defined contribution). It collects pension-plan level data on plan type, match structure, match rates, contributions, and automatic enrollment.
The NCS also has information on employer costs. It uses these cost data to calculate the Employer Cost for Employee Compensation (ECEC) series, which includes estimates of the levels of average hourly costs to employers for compensation, and the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which estimates quarterly changes in these costs. The costs include wages and salaries and a variety of employee benefit categories, such as paid leave, health insurance, and retirement. In the ECEC microdata, each benefit cost is averaged across workers in a particular job, even though there may be some variation among workers within the job in take-up of or eligibility for the benefit (see Chapter 8 in BLS Handbook of Methods).
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For our analysis, we use NCS data from 2010/2011. We start with private-sector establishments for which there are about 14,000 establishment-job-plan records. We restrict our sample to single-employer DC plans. We then select savings and thrift plans since this is the only type of 401(k) plan for which the NCS collects information about both employer match rates and auto enrollment. 5 structure of only these plans. After dropping some duplicate records, our final sample includes roughly 3,800 job-level observations uniquely identifying about a 1,200 savings and thrift plans with flat match structures.
In our analysis, the key variables of interest are first dollar match rate, match percent, potential match rate, default percent, default match rate, an auto enrollment indicator, DC costs, and other compensation cost variables (Table 1 ). The first dollar match rate is the percentage of an employee's first dollar of contributions that is matched by the employer. The match percent is the maximum percentage of pay that an employer will match. To capture the overall generosity of the plans, we also calculate a potential match rate (Dworak-Fisher, 2007) . That is the amount that employers contribute, as a percentage of wages, when employees contribute enough to exhaust the employer's match offer. For example, if a plan offers a 50 percent match up to 6 percent of wages that the employee contributes, then the first dollar match rate is 50, the match percent is 6, and the potential match rate is 3 percent. In plans with automatic enrollment, the default percent is the default employee contribution rate. If it is lower than the match percent, then effectively it is the default percentage of pay that an employer will match if an employee does not actively make a selection. Following this is the default match rate which is similar to the potential match rate but computed using the default percent instead of the match percent. It is equivalent to the percent of salary that the employer would be contributing if all workers remained at the default contribution rate. Some plans with automatic enrollment also have escalating employee default contribution rates. In that respect, the default max percent and default max match rate are analogous to the default percent and default match rate, respectively, using the default percent reached at the end of the escalation. DC costs come from the ECEC data and represent an employer's average cost per labor hour for providing DC plan(s) to its employees in a given job.
In the descriptive analysis we use job-level weights to reflect the percentage of workers in the private sector who have jobs with a DC plan of particular characteristics.
Descriptive Analyses
In this section we first describe the prevalence of automatic enrollment. Then we analyze establishment characteristics, participation rates, match rates, and employer costs to better understand how they differ between plans with and without automatic enrollment. Table 2 Table 3 compares participation and plan provisions among workers with and without automatic enrollment.
Distribution of Workers in Plans with and without Auto Enrollment.
Overall, 68.7 percent of workers participate in their employers' plans. Confirming the findings of previous studies, we find that plans with automatic enrollment have higher participation rates than those without this plan feature-77.1 versus 67.3 percent (Beshears et al. 2009; Choi et al. 2002 Choi et al. , 2004 Madrian and Shea 2001) .
Overall, workers have their first dollar of contributions matched an average of 71.1 percent by employers. However, the first dollar match rate statistically differs by whether their plan has an auto enrollment provision -72.1 percent for those without automatic enrollment, but only 65.4 percent for those with this plan feature. Overall, workers have their contributions matched up to an average of 5 percent of pay; however, the match percent does not differ significantly between workers with and without automatic enrollment. Workers' potential match rates average 3.5 percent overall and statistically differ between those with and without autoenrollment plans -3.5 percent for those without auto enrollment compared with 3.2 percent for those with this plan feature. In most industries we examine, average potential match rates are higher among workers without auto enrollment than those with this provision ( Figure 5 ).
Differences are especially large for workers in the transportation & public utilities and retail trade sectors. In establishments with less than 1,000 employees and those with 2,500-4,999
employees, potential match rates are also higher among workers without auto enrollment than those with it ( Figure 6 ). However, differences are especially large for workers in establishments with less than 500 employees. DC plan costs depend not only on how much the employer offers to match, but also on how much workers actually contribute. While we know nothing about employees' actual contributions, we do know the default contribution percent of plans with automatic enrollment.
including both establishments with and without DC plans, this result reflects the fact that higher wage workers are more likely to have access to DC plans.
Previous literature has shown that workers are slow to move away, if at all, from the default percent once enrolled (Choi et al., 2004) . If that is the case, the default contribution percent and the resulting default employer match rate might get us closer to the actual cost of a DC plan than the potential match rate would.
The average default percent for workers in auto enrollment plans is 2.8, which is 2.3 percentage points lower than the match percent (Table 3) . Even with the built-in escalation of the default contribution in 22 percent of our plans, the default max percent is 3.4-1.7
percentage points lower than the match percent. Thus, on average, firms in our sample are defaulting their workers at a contribution rate at which workers cannot take full advantage of the employer match. Figure 8 compares the match percent in plans with and without automatic enrollment and shows how it differs from the default percent. Although the average match percent does not differ significantly for plans with and without automatic enrollment (see Table   3 ), there are differences in the distribution. About half of plans with auto enrollment have a match percent that is more than 5 but less or equal to 6 percent, compared with only 37 percent of those without auto enrollment. Even more noticeable is the difference between the distributions of the match percent and default percent among plans with automatic enrollment.
Only 3 percent of plans have a default percent that is more than 5, while 87 percent of plans have a default percent of 3 percent or less. The default max percent mitigates the difference between the default and match percents a bit, but the difference is still noticeable. Figure 9 shows the combined effect of the first dollar match rate and the match or default percent by comparing the distributions of the potential match rate and the default match rate.
Three-quarters of plans with automatic enrollment have a default match rate and two-thirds have a default max match rate of 2 percent or less of pay; however, less than a third of them have a potential match rate within that same range. An even a smaller percentage of plans without automatic enrollment have a potential match rate of 2 percent or less of pay.
Thus, employers with auto enrollment plans may have found another way to offset the higher costs that come with higher participation rates created by automatic enrollment. By setting default match rates lower than potential match rates, employers can contribute to the accounts of more workers without necessarily increasing their costs. per labor hour. In contrast, for those without auto enrollment, hourly wages average $26 per labor hour, health insurance benefits average $2.9 per labor hour, and total costs average $37.6
per labor hour.
The average cost per labor hour for defined contribution plans, unlike match rates and auto enrollment provisions, are not specific to particular plans. Instead, these data reflect employer costs accrued at the job level for defined contribution plans. 9 For example, DC costs vary by jobs in the establishment, but not by plans within that job-it is an aggregate measure of the cost per hour of providing DC plan(s) to workers on that job. Nonetheless, DC costs should be correlated with the potential match rate, which our results show is significantly lower among auto enrollment plans. 10 Furthermore, in addition to the employers' matching contributions, DC costs include administrative and other expenses that are likely to be higher in plans with auto enrollment provisions than those without (Andersen et al. 2001 ). However, our descriptive statistics show no statistically significant difference between the DC costs of plans with and without automatic enrollment (Table 4) .
Multivariate Analyses
In this section, we analyze the relationship between automatic enrollment and employer match rates and compensation using a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on planlevel and establishment-level data.
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costs low. At best, when analyzing total DC costs, our results show these two factors working in combination and we are not able to separately identify their effects.
The key predictor in our models is an indicator for whether 9 See also Dworak-Fisher (2007) the plan includes automatic enrollment features. Our hypothesis is that auto enrollment is negatively correlated with either employer match rates or other forms of employer compensation.
We report robust standard errors, clustered on state level.
Automatic Enrollment and Participation. Table 5 presents results from an OLS regression of the effect of automatic enrollment, along with other factors, on plan participation.
Our hypothesis, as noted in the introduction, is that as automatic enrollment increases participation rates, firms will need to find a way to offset the additional costs-either by readjusting the match rate or by reducing other types of compensation. For this reason, we test whether automatic enrollment is associated with higher participation rates in our sample of savings and thrift plans, controlling for other factors. Consistent with other studies, we find that the coefficient on automatic enrollment is positive and highly significant-suggesting that auto enrollment is correlated with higher participation rates.
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The above result is not particularly surprising, since the literature on automatic enrollment has consistently and unambiguously reported strong positive effects of automatic enrollment on participation. However, the literature on the effects of the employer match on participation has produced conflicting results. While most studies have found a strong positive link between participation in a retirement plan and the existence of an employer match, the relationship between participation and the level of the match has not been proven to be particularly strong. For example, Beshears et al (2010) , in a sample of nine firms with automatic enrollment, found that decreasing the employer match by 1 percent of pay was associated with a 1.8 to 3.8 percentage point decrease in the plan participation rate at six months of eligibility, and Among savings and thrift plans, those with automatic enrollment have average participation rates that are 7 percentage points higher rates than those without auto enrollment.
pension plan and does not collect information about its provisions, including autoenrollment. Thus, our sample includes only plans with a positive employer match.
concluded that the presence of an automatic enrollment provision diminishes the need for employers to provide generous matches. In that respect, our results side with the studies that find positive but only weak effects of the employer match itself. We find that the effect of the potential match rate on participation is positive, but small and not statistically different from zero. 13 Hence, automatic enrollment is a much stronger determinant of participation than the potential match rate-suggesting that reducing the potential match rate would not have significant effects on plan participation. Moreover, the second column in Table 5 shows results from an OLS regression of the relationship between the default match rate and plan participation among plans with automatic enrollment. Although positive, the coefficient on the default match rate is also not statistically different from zero and is much smaller that the coefficient on auto enrollment. This result suggests that another way for employers to keep costs down after implementing automatic enrollment would be to set a relatively low default match rate because it would not negatively impact participation. This finding is also consistent with those of other studies. For example, Nessmith, Utkus, and Young (2007) found that quit rates among employees who had been automatically enrolled in their employers' retirement plans did not vary in response to the default contribution rate.
Impact of Automatic Enrollment on Employer Match
Rates. Next we estimate the correlation between automatic enrollment and the potential match rate, the first dollar match rate, and the match percent (Table 6 ). We control for industry, establishment size, share of workers in that plan who also have a DB plan, proportion of full-time and union workers, metropolitan area, and geographic region.
The first column of the significantly. Also, plans among establishments located in metropolitan areas also have significantly higher potential match rates than those in nonmetropolitan areas, while those in the South have significantly lower potential rates than those in the Northeast. To capture the generosity of establishments, we also control for the share of workers with defined benefit plans, the share of full-time workers, and the share of union workers. None of these variables are significant determinants of the potential match rate, although a couple of them are correlated with the first dollar match rate and/or the match percent. Finally, some plans provisions in the NCS data have been imputed via a statistical match. We control for this using a flag and find that it is not statistically significantly correlated with our dependent variables.
We also estimated these regressions using plan-level weights to understand the effect of automatic enrollment on employer matches for a sample that is representative of the population of workers in these plans. The results (not presented here) show that in the weighted sample the effect of automatic enrollment on the potential match rate increases in both its size and significance. In the weighted regression, average potential match rates offered to workers in plans with an automatic enrollment feature are 0.42 percentage points lower than those offered to workers in plans without automatic enrollment. This result is likely driven by the fact that when we weight by workers, we give more importance to the relationship between automatic enrollment and match rates in smaller establishments as they represent a bigger share of the workforce. As we showed in the descriptive statistics, the difference in potential match rates between plans with and without automatic enrollment is greater in small establishments than in larger ones.
Impact of Automatic Enrollment on Compensation Costs.
In the previous section, we showed that plans with automatic enrollment had lower match rates than those without this plan feature. Next, we consider the relationship between auto enrollment and employer compensation. Because the ECEC data calculates compensation costs on the job level, rather than associating them with a particular plan, we estimate these equations on the establishment level. With that in mind, the definition of the automatic enrollment dummy changes slightly and now equals one if there exists at least one savings and thrift plan with automatic enrollment at that establishment. Table 7 shows the results of a regression of automatic enrollment on total employer costs, including those from DC plans. Although most of the variables have the expected sign with relation to total costs, we find no evidence that automatic enrollment, which we showed to be correlated with higher participation, is correlated with higher costs.
We then consider whether the reason auto enrollment has no impact on total costs is because employers are offsetting the higher costs of providing DC plans by lowering their other compensation. To do this, we jointly estimate a number of cost equations in a seemingly unrelated regressions model (SUR), allowing us to test cross-equation restrictions and the possibility that the error terms across equations are contemporaneously correlated. We use the estimator proposed by Zellner (1962) . We write the SUR model as:
where is the ith equation's dependent variable, on which we have T observations. The error
′ � is assumed to have an expectation of zero and a covariance matrix of Ω. We assume that � � = , = , otherwise zero, to allow the error terms in different equations to be contemporaneously correlated, but assuming that they are not correlated at other points. The efficient estimator for this problem is generalized least squares, which we implement in Stata via the SUREG command.
14 The second set of regressions in Table 7 show the seemingly unrelated regression results for DC costs and non-DC costs. We find no evidence that firms with auto enrollment have DC costs that are different-higher or lower-from those without auto enrollment. We also find no evidence that these firms have different non-DC costs, nor any evidence that DC costs crowd out non-DC costs. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on automatic enrollment is jointly equal to zero in the two equations. The Breusch-Pagan test of independence, however, strongly rejects the hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated (p < .01), indicating that the SUR model is the appropriate specification.
With regard to the share of total compensation that DC costs constitute, we also find no statistically significant difference between firms with and without automatic enrollment.
Interestingly, the higher a firm's average total compensation, the more it spends on its DC plans.
For example, the DC cost share for firms in the middle quintile of total compensation is 0.6 percentage points higher than for firms in the bottom quintile; and it is 1.7 percentage points higher for firms in the top quintile than for those in the bottom quintile. Table 8 shows the seemingly unrelated regression results for various employer costs. We group the costs in the following categories: defined contributions, wages, legal (Social Security, Medicare, state/federal unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation), health insurance, defined benefit, leave (vacation, holidays, sick leave, and other leave), insurance (life insurance and short-term and long-term disability insurance), and other costs (non-production bonuses, severance pay, and supplemental unemployment insurance). Again, there is no evidence that firms with and without auto enrollment have different DC costs. However, auto enrollment is associated with higher costs for health insurance and leave benefits, and lower costs for defined benefit pensions. A significance test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on automatic enrollment across equations are jointly equal to zero (p < .05). Additionally, there is no evidence that DC costs crowd out other forms of employer compensation. Many of the coefficients have the expected signs. In general, costs per labor hour increase with establishment size and the percentage of full-time workers. Employer costs are higher in metropolitan areas and the 14 If all the equations in our SUR specification have the same number of observations and a common set of independent variables, then the coefficients would be identical to OLS; however, estimating a SUR model allows for tests of cross-equation constraints.
Northeast and are lowest in nonmetropolitan areas and the Midwest. Interestingly, the share of union workers in an establishment positively influences the costs associated with legal requirements, health insurance, and other insurance, but has no significant impact on the costs for DC plans, wages, DB pensions, or leave. Almost across the board, transportation and public utilities sectors have the highest employer costs.
Finally, the larger the share of workers covered by a DB plan, the lower the average DC costs, suggesting that employers consider these benefits to be substitutes for one another.
However, the share of workers with DB plans and the share of workers with another DC plan are positively correlated with a number of employer benefits, suggesting that establishments with large shares of workers with DB plans or multiple DC plans pay higher total compensation, on average, to attract and retain more productive workers or for other reasons that are unknown. Table 9 shows similar regressions, but for the cost shares. Again, we find no evidence that firms with auto enrollment spend a larger or smaller share of their total costs on DC plans than those without auto enrollment. However, auto enrollment is associated with a lower share of total costs going to DB pensions and a higher share going to leave benefits. A significance test weakly rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on automatic enrollment are jointly equal to zero across the equations (p < .10). Again, there is no evidence that DC costs crowd out other forms of employer compensation.
Conclusions
Most pension-related research has focused on individuals' behavior -whether workers participate in a 401(k), how much they contribute, and how they make investment choices. Even the discussion surrounding automatic enrollment has focused on how it benefits employees by increasing their pension coverage and ultimately their retirement savings. Comparatively little is known about employer decisions regarding retirement plans, yet employer actions surrounding these plans substantially affect future retirement security. By boosting plan participation, automatic enrollment likely increases employer costs as previously unenrolled workers receive matching retirement plan contributions. Employers might respond to the surge in retirement plan costs associated with automatic enrollment by trimming match rates to 401(k) plans or reducing other compensation.
Recognizing that automatic enrollment is not free for employers, Soto and Butrica (2009) was the first study to examine the relationship between automatic enrollment and employer matching behavior. The authors showed that firms with auto enrollment have lower employer match rates than those without automatic enrollment, suggesting that employers might reduce match rates when they begin automatically enrolling participants.
This study reexamines the findings in Soto and Butrica (2009) using better and more recent data, and expands that study to more broadly analyze the relationship between auto enrollment and total compensation. Like Soto and Butrica (2009), we find employer match rates are negatively and significantly correlated with auto enrollment. The potential match rate averages 3.5 percent for plans without automatic enrollment, but only 3.2 percent for those with automatic enrollment. Even controlling for other factors, we find that the potential match rate is 0.38 percentage points lower for firms with automatic enrollment than for those without this provision. Although the effect of automatic enrollment may seem modest, it is potentially bigger when one considers that the average default match rate in our sample is only 1.8 percent. Thus, on average, firms in our sample are defaulting their workers at a contribution rate at which workers cannot take full advantage of the employer match.
We also find that automatic enrollment is associated with a 7 percentage point increase in plan participation. Despite this, we find no statistical difference between the DC costs of establishments with and without auto enrollment. In addition, we find no evidence that DC costs crowd out other forms of employer compensation-suggesting that firms might be lowering their match rates-the potential and/or the default-enough to completely offset the higher costs of automatic enrollment without needing to simultaneously reduce other compensation costs.
Thus, while auto enrollment is likely to boost the retirement savings of workers who would not participate without it, our findings suggest it could lead to lower account balances at retirement for those who were already enrolled or would have enrolled anyway. Furthermore, the prospect of lower match rates may not only reduce employer contributions to retirement accounts, but might also lower workers' contributions (Engelhardt and Kumar 2007; Even and Macpherson 2005 Employer's match rate on the first dollar of employee's contribution (e.g 50 cents on the dollar or 50 percent).
Match percent
Integer from 0 to 100
The employer matches contributions up to this percentage of pay (e.g. employee's contribution is matched up to 6 percent of pay).
Potential match rate Integer from 0 to 100 Maximum employer's contribution as a percentage of salary. Alternatively, the percentage of salary that the employer would contribute if the employee contributed enough to exhaust the employer's match offer. This is computed as: (first dollar match rate*match percent)/100.
Default percent
Integer from 0 to 100 In plans with automatic enrollment, the default employee contribution percentage.
Default match rate Integer from 0 to 100 This is computed as: (first dollar match rate*min(default percent,match percent))/100. Default max percent
Integer from 0 to 100 In plans with automatic enrollment, the default employee contribution percentage at the end of the escalation process
Default max match rate Integer from 0 to 100 This is computed as: (first dollar match rate*min(default max percent, match percent))/100. Leave costs $ per labor hour Includes vacation, holidays, sick leave, and other leave to workers in a given job.
Insurance costs $ per labor hour Includes life insurance and short-term and long-term disability.
Other costs $ per labor hour Include non-production bonuses, severance pay, and supplemental unemployment insurance. 
